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CAPACITY BUILDING FOR 
MARITIME SECURITY 
COOPERATION: WHAT ARE WE 
TALKING ABOUT?
Sam Bateman
Introduction
This paper discusses the notions of "maritime security" and "capacity 
building" in the context of capacity building for maritime security 
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. What constitutes capacity for providing 
maritime security at the national, sub-regional and regional levels? What 
capabilities does a country require to ensure its security against 
maritime threats, including the threat of maritime terrorism and the 
risk that its maritime transportation system may be used for terrorist 
purposes? How do all these capabilities fit together to provide security 
against both conventional and non-conventional threats? Can we put 
capabilities for conventional (or traditional) security threats into one 
box and then those for non-conventional (or non-traditional) threats in 
another? Are we also talking about maritime safety? What is the 
relationship between the different concepts of maritime security? 
Conventional and comprehensive? Traditional and non-traditional? 
National and domestic?
Current Situation
At present the region lacks effective arrangements and the necessary 
capacity to provide for the safety and security of shipping and seaborne 
trade and to maintain law and order at sea generally. Current weaknesses 
include: lack of political and social will; lack of maritime awareness; 
ineffective arrangements for maritime jurisdiction and enforcement; 
differing interpretations of the Law of the Sea; weak regional 
participation in relevant international legal instruments; and lack of 
capacity to implement appropriate measures to ensure maritime security. 
These weaknesses occur both at a national level and at a regional level.
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At a national level, many countries in the region lack the capacity 
to provide adequate security in waters under their national jurisdiction 
and to implement international standards for ship and port security, 
especially the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. 
New international measures for ocean security are generally optimised 
for developed countries and challenge the capacity of developing 
countries that may have other priorities of poverty alleviation and 
development. The latter countries face a particular difficulty with 
implementing the legal regimes that have been developed at an 
international level. The old adage of international environmental 
management: "think globally, act regionally" applies here. This reflects 
the thought that with maritime security as with many other areas of 
international regime building, the global thinking has largely been done 
and the challenge now is to apply these principles at the regional and 
national levels. It is not hard to come up with good ideas on what needs 
to be done at a global level but it is much harder making these ideas 
work at a regional and national level.
At a regional level, the region lacks established procedures and 
frameworks for information exchange and for operational coordination 
to provide both maritime security and maritime safety. Bilateral 
sensitivities continue to inhibit cooperation between the maritime 
security forces of neighbouring countries and there is a lack of 
established arrangements for cooperation both between neighbouring 
countries and between the coastal States and the so-called "user" States 
whose ships and trade pass through the waters under the jurisdiction 
of the coastal States. Capacity building at the regional level requires 
cooperation and coordination, and talk and dialogue between regional 
countries. Thus capacity-building initiatives might also be seen as 
maritime confidence and security building measures (MCSBMs).
Regional Developments
The notion of capacity building for maritime security cooperation is not 
new in the region. The Japan Coast Guard (JCG) has been extremely active 
in recent years with capacity-building, particularly in Southeast Asia, 
with maritime training and exercises with regional maritime security 
forces. The JCG also offers training for foreign personnel at its training
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institutions in Japan; is assisting both Malaysia and Indonesia with 
developing national coast guard forces; and has hosted Port Security 
Seminars in Southeast Asian countries in order to assist with the 
implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) 
Code which came into effect on 1 July 2004.
The JCG has taken a leading role with the development of the Asia 
Maritime Security Initiative 2004 (AMARSECTIVE 2004) agreed at a 
meeting of the Heads of Asian Coast Guards in Tokyo in June 20041 and 
the more recently agreed Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating 
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).2 All ASEAN 
nations, Japan, China, Korea, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are 
working under ReCAAP to set up an information network and a 
cooperation regime to prevent piracy and armed robbery against ships 
in the regional waters. ReCAAP is a very significant achievement for 
the region that provides the basis for regional cooperation to counter 
piracy and armed robbery against ships. It includes an authoritative 
definition of "armed robbery against ships"3 and provides for the 
establishment of an Information Sharing Centre (ISC) to be located in 
Singapore.
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum has taken a 
number of capacity building initiatives for maritime security. In February 
2003, APEC Senior Officials endorsed a Counter Terrorism Action Plan 
(CTAP). This lists specific objectives and expected outputs by APEC 
economies to secure cargoes, to protect people in transit, to secure ships 
engaged in international voyages, to ensure the security of international 
aviation, to halt the financing of terrorism, to enhance cyber security, to
1 'Coastguards Adopt Amarsective 2004', The Star online, 28 June 2004.
2 'Asian Nations Band to Fight Piracy', The Straits Times (Singapore) online, 13 November 
2004.
3 ReCAAP Article 1(2) states that "For the purposes of this Agreement, "armed robbery 
against ships" means any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends and directed against a ship, or against persons or property on board such 
ship, in a place within a Contracting Party's jurisdiction over such offences;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship with knowledge of facts 
making it a ship for armed robbery against ships;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) 
or (b)." 5
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secure energy supplies and to protect the health of APEC communities.4 
The CTAP recognises that capacity building and the assessment of needs 
are essential to its successful implementation. It encourages all APEC 
members to both identify their capacity building needs and outline what 
expertise they can offer other APEC members in the area of capacity 
building.
The Secure Trade in the Asia-Pacific Region (STAR) initiative 
developed by APEC provides for the protection of ships and cargoes; 
promotes the introduction of ship and port security plans; provides for 
the accreditation of seafarer manning agencies in the region; promotes 
cooperation on fighting piracy; sets standards for ship borne detection 
equipment and technology; and pays particular attention to energy 
security including the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs). 
The first STAR conference held in Bangkok in February 2003 cited the 
need to strengthen the institutional capacity of governments as essential 
to the success of the program.
Maritime security is mainly handled in APEC through the 
Transportation Working Group (TPTWG) and the Maritime Security 
Experts Group. The latter group's discussion at the 24th TPTWG held in 
Bangkok, 16-20 August 2004, included discussion of the training under 
the ISPS Code and the capacity building needs of APEC economies in 
the maritime security arena. Earlier, the APEC High Level Meeting in 
Maritime Security Cooperation held in Manila, 8-9 September 2003, had 
drawn up an indicative list of capacity-building needs of APEC 
economies related to the implementation of maritime security measures 
and agreed to present this to international financial institutions. At the 
recent APEC Summit held in Santiago, Chile, President Bush and six 
other leaders launched the ISPS Code Implementation Assistance 
Program to assist fellow APEC members in complying with the ISPS 
Code through technical assistance and grants, which will be provided 
beginning in 2005.5
4 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Submission to United Nations Counter 
Terrorism Committee Meeting, Washington, 7 October 2003 (dated 18/09/2003). Available 
at <www.apec.org>
5 'Fact Sheet: U.S. Actions on the APEC Leaders' Meeting: Ensuring Security, Promoting 
Prosperity', Washington File, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 21 November 
2004.
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The Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) launched by the 
United States of America earlier this year is another regional 
development that has significant capacity building implications. It arose 
from a U.S. concern that the littoral states adjacent to the Malacca and 
Singapore Straits lacked the capacity to provide sufficient security for 
the shipping and seaborne trade passing through those straits. It 
postulated some involvement of the U.S. in providing that security but 
mainly due to sensitivities of sovereignty on the part of Malaysia and 
Indonesia in particular, it was not well received in the region at least 
initially. Major elements of the RMSI include increased situational 
awareness, information sharing, a decision-making architecture and 
interagency cooperation.6 These are fundamental elements of the 
regional capacity to provide for the security of shipping passing through 
the Malacca Strait.
Maritime Security
Events of 9/11 and subsequent perceptions of a terrorist threat to 
shipping and seaborne trade have forced a reappraisal of what we mean 
by "maritime security". It has a traditional meaning for navies and 
defence forces which have the role of protecting the nation and its 
national maritime interests7 against traditional threats. These threats 
are usually of a military nature and formulated on the basis of strategic 
assessments and appreciations of the regional security environment. 
They recognise a government's first responsibility to provide for the 
security and well being of its citizens, including the protection of national 
sovereignty, both territory and people.
As well as direct national maritime security interests such as 
protection of sovereignty, offshore resources and shipping, a country 
has shared interests with its neighbours. These include maintenance of 
a stable maritime environment that will prevent threats arising and 
prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
6 ADM Tom Fargo USN, Commander, US Pacific Command, Address to MILOPS 
Conference in Victoria, British Columbia, 3 May 2004, 3-5. Available at <http:// 
www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2004/040503milops.shtml>
7 The national maritime interests of a country include shipping and seaborne trade, 
marine resources, protection of sovereignty (including sovereignty over offshore 
territory), law and order at sea and protection and preservation of the marine 
environment.
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Nations have to talk about and agree on issues such as the principles of 
the law of the sea, the prevention of marine pollution, the conservation 
of fish stocks, the safety and security of shipping, and the delimitation 
of maritime boundaries. In implementing policies on these issues, nations 
have to take into account the interests and rights of their neighbours, as 
well as those of other countries, who legitimately send ships into and 
through their waters. Failure to address these issues on a cooperative 
basis fundamentally inhibits the development of a stable maritime 
security environment in the region.
The concept of maritime security has expanded following 9/11. It is 
still about protecting the security and well being of its citizens but instead 
of overt threats from military forces, the threats of concern are veiled 
and perhaps even "unthinkable". This new focus for maritime security 
is apparent in the work of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
and other international organizations concerned with making 
international shipping and seaborne trade more secure against the threat 
of maritime terrorism. This is not what naval officers and militaries think 
about when they talk of "maritime security". This is not their business. 
Conferences and meetings are held these days on "maritime security" 
and there is hardly a naval officer in sight.8 Navies see their business as 
protecting the nation beyond its shores and are not necessarily involved 
with the security of port facilities or ships in port. These activities are 
regarded as civil policing responsibilities and the task of marine police 
or the coast guard.
Concepts of Maritime Security
What is the interface (if any) between the traditional concept of maritime 
security and the new concept evident in with the ISPS Code and the focus 
on securing shipping and seaborne trade from the threat of terrorism? 
Navies have always been involved with the protection of shipping and 
clearly would provide the top end of the response capability in the event 
of an actual terrorist threat or the threat of such an attack. The Baltic 
and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) uses the term "maritime 
security" to cover the risks associated with drug smuggling, piracy, and
8 Such as the APEC High Level Meeting in Maritime Security Cooperation held in 
Manila, 8-9 September 2003.
8
Capacity Building for Maritime Security Cooperation: What Are We Talking About?
armed robbery against ships, stowaways, migrant smuggling and the 
threat of terrorism.9 These are all activities that involve the criminal 
abuse of the maritime transportation system and might involve delays 
and disruption to the movements of commercial shipping. They relate 
to the meaning of "security" in commercial law that has to do with 
instruments that affect the performance of a contract.
In criticising the U.S. Government's management of Homeland 
Security, Stephen Flynn, a former U.S. Coast Guard officer and Homeland 
Security activist, has argued that "[p]art of the problem is that 
Washington continues to treat domestic and national security as 
distinguishable from one another".10 Similarly, he noted that "[i]n the 
case of the U.S. Navy, until recently, this desire to stay out of the homeland 
defense business even applied to safeguarding its own fleet within U.S. 
ports".11 Thus Flynn claims that the Pentagon has distinguished between 
"homeland defense" and "homeland security" and has assigned itself 
the role of dealing with threats that emanate only from outside the U.S.12 
This distinction between domestic security (homeland security) and 
national security (or homeland defense) is instructive in helping us to 
understand the concept of maritime security that we might adopt in the 
Study Group.
National security is equated with protecting the nation beyond its 
shores -  or what might be seen normally as national defence -  while 
domestic security refers to what takes place on land -  the hardening of 
critical infrastructure, personnel identity documentation for people 
working on ships and in ports, and arrangements for port security both 
on the land side (perimeter fencing, access controls, etc) and on the 
waterside with channel security and waterborne security patrols of the 
port area. Domestic security is not a concern of our CSCAP Study Group
9 Ove Tvedt, 'Drug Trafficking, Refugees, and Illegal Immigrants' in Proshanto K. 
Mukherjee, Maximo Q. Meija Jr., and Gotthard M. Gauci (eds.), Maritime Violence and other 
Security Issues at Sea, Proceedings of the Symposium on Maritime Violence and other 
Security Issues at Sea (Malmo, Sweden, World Maritime University, 2002), 167.
10 Stephen Flynn, America the Vulnerable- How our Government is Failing to Protect Us from 
Terrorism, (New York, Harper Collins Publishers in cooperation with the Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2004), 50.
11 Ibid. 39.
12 Ibid. 214.
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except for the technical cooperation that might be involved in assisting 
some countries to build their capacity to provide domestic security.
Border protection is a major dimension of national security. This 
involves both protecting against the maritime transportation system 
being used to import terrorist materials, including possible WMD, or 
other illicit materials, such as drug, arms and even human beings, as 
well as surveillance, patrols and response at sea to protect sovereignty, 
to prevent illegal entry of people or goods and to enforce national laws 
against crimes at sea.
A distinction might be made between "surveillance", "patrol" and 
"response". Surveillance is most effectively undertaken by aircraft but 
satellites and land-based radars systems might also be used, such as 
the Marine Electronic Highway (MEH) in the Malacca Strait. 
Consideration also has to be given to surveillance and identification 
systems for developing maritime situational awareness and for long 
range identification and tracking (LRIT) of vessels, including the use of 
automatic identification systems (AIS). Patrols might be conducted by 
both ship and aircraft and are mainly for deterrence purposes by 
demonstrating a physical presence in an area of interest although they 
also ensure that the means are available in the area to identify a 
suspicious target that has been detected by other means. Response 
invariably requires a surface ship to board and if necessary detain a 
suspicious vessel.
The enforcement of national laws at sea is conducted within the 
framework of domestic law and international law obligations. These are 
often referred to as "constabulary operations" and may be conducted 
by a coast guard, as well as by conventional naval forces. Crimes at sea 
might be defined as "a criminal offence connected to the sea or to 
ships".13 They are frequently transnational in nature with more than 
one national jurisdiction involved. There are many offences that might 
fall within this definition and constitute a breakdown in law and order 
at sea. Relevant offences might comprise piracy, maritime terrorism, drug 
trafficking, human smuggling, illegal fishing, and offences against the 
marine environment (e.g. ship-sourced marine pollution). "Maritime 
violence" is another term used in the current international environment
Capacity Building for Maritime Security Cooperation: What Are We Talking About?
13 CSCAP Memorandum No.5 -  Cooperation for Law and Order at Sea.
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where it is often difficult to make precise distinctions between different 
types of crimes at sea (particularly piracy and maritime terrorism). Thus 
the Model National Law on Acts of Piracy or Maritime Violence developed 
in the IMO includes a very comprehensive definition of what constitutes 
"maritime violence".14
Considerations of national and domestic security also invite 
consideration of supply chain security. The container transport chain is 
a massively complex system with numerous players including the 
shipper, transport operators, specialized terminals and handling 
facilities, and freight integrators. Terrorists targeting the container 
transport chain might use one of two approaches: they might intercept 
a legitimate consignment and tamper with it (the "hijack" scenario) or 
develop a legitimate trading identity to ship an illegitimate and 
dangerous consignment (the "Trojan horse" scenario).
Most of the attention with ensuring the security of the supply chain 
has so far focused on the intermediate stages in the chain, the port 
terminals and the ships. Concern is now shifting to the inland carriers 
and freight integrators operating in the first few and last few links of 
the chain. These represent more of a security risk than their larger 
counterparts further down the chain (i.e. the terminal operators and 
shipping managers).These are issues which are being addressed by APEC 
and other regional forums. The CSCAP Study Group has a potential 
contribution to make to supply chain security through its regional 
dimensions and the possibility of helping to promote supply chain 
security at the regional level through cooperation and dialogue.
Safety and Security
There is a close relationship between maritime safety and maritime 
security. While a distinction between the two meanings is apparent in 
English, in some languages they may almost be synonymous.15 In the 
past it was normal in the shipping sector to make a distinction between 
safety and security. The 1974 International Convention for the Safety of
14 Maximo Quibranza Mejia Jr, 'Defining Maritime Violence and Maritime Security', in 
Mukherjee et alv Maritime Violence and other Security Issues at Sea, 36
15 Ibid. p.28.
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Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention), for example, related to safety at sea16 
while the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), and its Protocol 
related to offshore installations, were concerned with security at sea. 
However, this has all changed following 9/11 and safety and security 
have now become "inextricably linked".17 Chapter XI of the SOLAS 
Convention has been retitled "Special measures to enhance maritime 
safety and security" and Part II of this chapter is entitled "Special 
measures to enhance maritime security".
Maritime security in this context has been defined as "those 
measures employed by owners, operators and administrators of vessels, 
port facilities, offshore installations, and other marine organizations or 
establishments to protect against seizure, sabotage, piracy, pilferage, 
annoyance or surprise".18 On the other hand, a definition of maritime 
safety might be "those measures employed by owners, operators, and 
administrators of vessels, port facilities, offshore installations, and other, 
marine organizations or establishments to prevent or minimize the 
occurrence of mishaps or incidents at sea that may be caused by 
substandard ships, unqualified crew, or operator error".19
Safety and security are not mutually exclusive. Maritime safety is 
part of comprehensive security and includes: maritime safety services 
(including search and rescue, rescue coordination centres and maritime 
safety communications); marine environmental protection (especially 
the prevention of and response to ship-sourced marine pollution); marine 
navigational aids and services; ship and personnel safety services (e.g., 
marine surveys, Port State Control, marine accident investigations, 
marine qualifications and identity documentation); and hydrographic 
surveying.
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16 The SOLAS Convention is generally regarded as the most important of all 
international treaties dealing with the safety of merchant ships. The main objective of the 
Convention is to specify minimum standards for the construction, equipment and 
operation of ships, compatible with their safety.
17 William O'Neill, 'Safety and Security Now Inextricably Linked', IMO News, 4 (2001),
4.
18 Mejia, 'Defining Maritime Violence and Maritime Security', 28.
19 Ibid.
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Summary
The dimensions of comprehensive (i.e. both traditional and non- 
traditional) maritime security where the CSCAP Study Group might be 
able to contribute comprise the following activities:
■ the maintenance of law and order at sea in the region, including the 
suppression and prevention of piracy, maritime terrorism, drug 
trafficking, human smuggling and ship-sourced marine pollution;
■ the security and safety of international shipping and seaborne trade 
passing through the region;
■ the provision of maritime safety services, including search and rescue 
operations, mitigation of natural hazards, disaster relief, rescue 
coordination centres, weather reporting, marine navigational aids 
and services and maritime safety communications;
■ marine environmental protection, particularly the prevention of and 
response to ship-sourced marine pollution;
■ maritime surveillance and information sharing, including the 
development of regional situational awareness; and
■ regional cooperation, particularly through training and education 
programs and the promotion of maritime awareness, to promote 
supply chain security and assist countries with their domestic 
security arrangements.
Capacity Building
Capacity at a national level includes the ability to provide adequate 
protection for maritime infrastructure (ports and port facilities), security 
in waters under national jurisdiction and border protection, as well as 
the ability to implement new international standards in ship security, 
cargo and port security, and seafarers' documentation and to discharge 
the country's responsibilities as a flag State.20 Capacity at the sub­
regional and regional levels will include arrangements for cooperation
20 Much of the breakdown in law and order at sea can be traced to the fact that some 
flag States are not discharging their responsibility in accordance with Article 94 of 
UNCLOS for vessels flying their flags when they commit offences at sea. This is the case 
for virtually all categories of maritime crime, but particularly illegal fishing, drug and 
arms trafficking, offences against the environment and human smuggling.
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and coordination of maritime security arrangements, information 
exchange, and cooperative training and education, as well as the 
development of protocols and systems to facilitate such arrangements.
Developing countries in particular face considerable difficulties in 
developing their capacity to provide maritime security. A formal 
description of the process of capacity building may be found in Chapter 
37 of Agenda 21.21 Although this description relates to capacity for 
managing and protecting the marine environment and its resources, it 
might also be usefully extended to capacity building for maritime 
security:
Specifically, capacity-building encompasses the country's 
human, scientific, technological, organisational, 
institutional and resource capabilities. A fundamental goal 
of capacity-building is to enhance the ability to evaluate and 
address the crucial questions related to policy choices and 
modes of implementation among development options, 
based on an understanding of environmental potentials and 
limits and of needs as perceived by the people of the country 
concerned.22
Capacity-building in developing countries requires cooperation between 
these countries and relevant international organisations, regional 
associations and with developed countries, as well as among the 
developing countries themselves. The aim of this process is to enhance 
the capacities of developing countries in the areas of data and 
information, scientific and technological means and human resource 
development. Capacity is usually regarded as including at least three 
elements: human resources, institutions and enabling environment. It 
is much more than simply training. Chapter 37 of Agenda 21 goes on to 
note that:
Technical cooperation, including that related to technology 
transfer and know-how, encompasses the whole range of
Capacity Building for Maritime Security Cooperation: What Are We Talking About?
21 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Agenda 21 (Rio de 
Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992), Chapter 17: Protection of the Oceans, All Kinds of Seas, Including 
Enclosed and Semi-enclosed Seas, and Coastal Areas and the Protection, Rational Use and 
Development of their Living Resources.
22 Ibid., paragraph 37.1.
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activities to develop or strengthen individual and group 
capacities and capabilities.
The remainder of this section provides an overview of the capacity
required for maritime security at both a national and regional levels,
along with considerations in determining how the particular capacity
should be developed.
Capacity Required at a National Level
Institutional Arrangements
■ Public sector departments and agencies responsible for developing 
and implementing policy for all dimensions of maritime security and 
maritime safety with the avoidance of duplication and clear 
specification of responsibilities.
■ Maritime security forces and law enforcement agencies (possibly also 
with capabilities for marine search and rescue). Again this is an area 
where duplication should be avoided. It makes no sense to have ships 
and aircraft of different agencies patrolling in the one area but for 
different purposes. Maritime security forces should have a cross- 
sectoral role.
■ Arrangements for the collection, analysis and dissemination of 
intelligence and for the determination of risk assessments related to 
maritime security threats.
■ National (and State or Provincial) Maritime Security Committee or 
Maritime Security Task Force that brings together policy and 
operational agencies and intelligence services;
- might also be required at a State or Provincial level;
- might also have Intelligence and Technology sub-committees.
■ Information centres (e.g. national focal points, regional coordinating 
centres, maritime rescue coordination centres, information sharing 
centre).
■ Arrangements for cooperation between the public and private sectors 
related to maritime safety and security.
15
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Legal Frameworks
■ Legislation and regulations for maritime security that should:
- identify entities with the legal authority to carry out investigations, 
arrests, and similar enforcement activities;
- establish jurisdiction over offences to address penalties 
establishing procedures for national and multilateral cooperation;
- strengthen criminal proceedings and extradition proceedings; and
strengthen prosecution procedures.
■ Memorandums of understanding (MOUs) or other agreements for 
mutual support and cooperation among maritime safety and security 
agencies.
Resources
■ National capabilities (ships, aircraft and systems, perhaps including 
land-based radars, AIS interrogation systems and surveillance 
satellites) for maritime surveillance, patrol and response in waters 
under national jurisdiction, as well as in the approaches to those 
waters.
■ Personnel with the appropriate education and training.
■ New technologies to provide situational awareness in adjacent 
maritime areas and to improve security in ports.
■ Financial resources, including where appropriate, assistance from 
international financial institutions.
Capacity Required at a Regional Level
Institutional Arrangements
■ Identify, strengthen and enhance existing cooperation among national 
focal points of contact.
■ Arrangements at a regional and/or sub-regional level for information 
collection and exchange.
■ Border control arrangements between neighbouring countries 
covering common measures with respect to certain activities that
16
might occur at sea within the vicinity of their maritime boundaries 
and cross those boundaries.
■ Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meetings that build 
cooperative relations among agencies and share information on 
maritime security in the Asian region. The "Heads of "Coast Guard 
Agencies" means "heads or acting-heads" of "authorities responsible 
for conducting law enforcement activities of anti-piracy and armed 
robbery against ships and other unlawful acts at sea, including 
maritime terrorism, when within their charter and/or providing 
assistance to persons and/or ships in distress at sea as a result of 
such attacks".23
■ Western Pacific N aval Symposium (WPNS) that brings together the 
navies of the Western Pacific. The last WPNS was held in Singapore 
in November 2004 and considered the possibility of regional security 
exercises.
■ The ReCAAP ICS in Singapore will be an important facility for the 
collection and analysis of data on piracy and armed robbery against 
ships.
■ A monitoring and surveillance regime for building up a regional 
picture of the incidence of operational ship pollution, as well as the 
processing of evidence to obtain a successful prosecution.
Legal Frameworks
■ Multilateral or bilateral legal arrangements that facilitate 
apprehension, investigation, hot pursuit, prosecution and extradition, 
exchange of witnesses, sharing of evidence, inquiry, seizure and 
forfeiture of the proceeds of maritime crime.
■ Maritime boundary agreements - regional States should move 
expeditiously to resolve existing boundary disputes to ensure that 
maritime jurisdiction might properly be exercised in the applicable 
zones. If boundaries cannot be resolved, countries should be prepared 
to enter into some form of provisional arrangements for maritime
Capacity Building for Maritime Security Cooperation: What Are We Talking About?
23 AMARSECTIVE 2004 adopted at the Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies' Meeting 
on 18 June 2004 in Tokyo. Heads of Agencies attended from Bangladesh, Brunei, 
Cambodia, China, Hong Kong China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam.
17
security in the disputed area without prejudice to their positions in 
the boundary negotiations.
* Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) or other agreements 
between neighbouring countries covering border controls and 
coordinated sea patrols. As a further development, neighbouring 
countries might agree to enforcement of each other's laws, rules and 
regulations in each other's jurisdiction. The Treaty of Niue, for 
example, provides a reciprocal enforcement regime for Pacific island 
countries.
■ Border control arrangements between neighbouring countries might 
include the countries agreeing to common measures with respect to 
certain activities that might occur at sea within the vicinity of their 
maritime boundaries and cross those boundaries.
■ Harmonization as far as possible of national maritime laws and 
regulations.
■ Technical cooperation to promote understanding and compliance 
with international obligations.
* Consideration might be given to the conclusion of bilateral protocols 
between neighbouring countries that are parties to the Convention 
relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution 
Damage to extend the Convention to their exclusive economic zones 
(EEZs). This would facilitate mitigation of the effects of ship-sourced 
marine pollution.
* Regional protocols on flag State responsibilities might be possible, 
as well as efforts to encourage regional States to ratify the UN 
Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships. Reciprocal ship 
boarding aspects might be covered by a series of bilateral treaties or 
a multilateral treaty under the auspices of the major convention 
granting States reciprocal rights of investigation automatically 
without the need to seek permission from the flag State.
■ Common agreement on the application of high seas enforcement 
principles in the EEZ in respect of offences other than those related 
to resources and the environment.
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Resources
■ Training Programs - enhanced cooperation and coordination in law 
enforcement and intelligence sharing with piracy and armed robbery 
at sea activities and other transnational crimes.
■ Potential cooperative activities with combating marine pollution 
include the development of common operating and reporting 
procedures, training for enforcement professionals, increasing 
awareness of legal process and obligations, development of 
enforcement guidelines and collaborative research to identify high 
risk areas.
■ Procedures for information sharing and dissemination to provide 
maritime situational awareness at the regional level. Specific areas 
of cooperation might include:
- an internet-accessible regional data-base of national legislation 
dealing with maritime security;
- an regional register of vessels that spans national and 
international laws;
- a web page of information and data related to law and order at 
sea in the region. This might include, for example, details of 
cooperative arrangements, status of relevant conventions and 
similar instruments.
■ Procedures for coordinated response at the tactical and operational 
levels.
■ Financial resources obtained by loans from international financial 
institutions and contributions from contracting Governments. The 
principle of "burden sharing" should be adopted between user States 
and coastal States adjacent to areas of high shipping density where 
maritime security threats are deemed to be higher.
Navies versus Coast Guards
In establishing capacity at a national level, consideration needs to be 
given to the relative roles of navies and coast guards. The core role of a 
navy is to conduct military operations at sea in defence of national 
security. This war fighting role and the capabilities it requires 
fundamentally underpin the ability of a navy to conduct constabulary
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operations or other activities at sea in accordance with foreign and 
domestic policy.24 Nonetheless, many of the world's navies "are not blue- 
water, power-projection, sea-control navies -  rather regional navies that 
also enforce laws, protect resources, conduct search and rescue, prevent 
environmental damage, and maintain aids to navigation".25 But on the 
other hand, major navies might be reluctant to become involved in 
policing against non-traditional security threats. As Flynn has described 
it, "the reality is that our old national security dogs are having a difficult 
time learning new tricks" and "senior officers reflexively protest that 
they are warriors, not cops, and have steadfastly resisted anything that 
looks like domestic law enforcement".26
Some countries might now prefer to use their coast guards in 
implementing maritime security regimes. Coast guard vessels may be 
more suitable than warships for employment in sensitive areas where 
there are conflicting claims to maritime jurisdiction and/or political 
tensions between parties. Regional coast guards are expanding rapidly.27 
Bangladesh, the Philippines and Vietnam have all established coast 
guards and China, Malaysia and Indonesia are following suit. The anti­
piracy operations by the JCG in Southeast Asian waters demonstrate 
the use of coast guards as instruments of foreign policy. Similarly, the 
JCG has been handling the operational side of Japan's involvement in 
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) rather than the Japanese 
Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF).
There are a number of reasons for establishing a separate coast 
guard. Legal considerations are major ones. A coast guard should be a 
para-military organisation. Its officers must have the ability to enforce 
national maritime laws with wide powers of arrest over both foreigners 
and national citizens but in many countries, there are constitutional and
24 According to the eminent British strategic thinker, Ken Booth, modem navies have 
three functions: diplomatic, constabulary and military. Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign 
Policy (London, Croom Helm, 1977), 15-16.
25 Vice Admiral James Loy USCG and Captain Bruce Stubbs USCG, 'Exporting Coast 
Guard Expertise', USN Institute Proceedings, May 1997,56.
26 Flynn, America the Vulnerable, 39
27 For a discussion of the development and expansion of coast guards in the region see 
Sam Bateman, 'Coast Guards: New Forces for Regional Order and Security', Asia Pacific 
Issues: Analysis from the East-West Center No.65 (Honolulu, East-West Center, January 2003).
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political reasons why military forces should not be involved in policing 
duties against national citizens.28 In the U.S. for example, the military is 
constrained by the principle of posse comitatus.29
Coast guard units are also more suitable than warships for 
employment in sensitive areas where there are conflicting claims to 
maritime jurisdiction and/or political tensions between parties. In such 
situations, the arrest of a foreign vessel by a warship may be regarded 
as highly provocative whereas arrest by a coast guard vessel may be 
accepted as a legitimate law enforcement measure. It signals that the 
arresting party views the incident as relatively minor. Abasic clash also 
exists between the military ethos of applying maximum available force 
to resolve a situation and that of law enforcement, which is more 
circumspect and usually involves minimum force. Lastly, there is the 
issue of costs with coast guard vessels and aircraft generally being less 
expensive than naval units. Furthermore, in developing countries the 
civil nature of the coast guard's role may support access to funding from 
international aid agencies to acquire new vessels.30
Legal Frameworks
Developing countries face particular problems with determining whether 
to ratify particular conventions. In the field of maritime security and 
safety, the articulation and enactment of sound and effective legislation 
is extremely important. There are numerous areas of deficiency with 
regard to the state of ratification of conventions dealing with the marine 
environment, maritime safety and pollution from ships. These 
conventions are not considered to be self-executing.
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28 Hugh Smith, 'The Use of Armed Forces in Law Enforcement”, in Doug MacKinnon and 
Dick Sherwood (eds.), Policing Australia's Offshore Zones -Problems and Prospects, (Wollongong 
Papers on Maritime Policy No.9, Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, 
1997), 74-97.
29 The Posse Comitatus Act in the United States embodies the traditional American 
principle of separating civilian and military authority and prohibits the use of the 
military in civilian law enforcement.
30 An example of this process is the acquisition by the Philippines Coast Guard of two 
large (56m length overall) "search and rescue vessels" that are clearly patrol vessels in 
every respect other than name. Bill Beecham, 'San Juan' and 'Don Emilio', Asia Pacific 
Shipping, 1:4 (January 2001), 18.
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States face a significant task in reviewing their position with regard 
to the various IMO conventions to determine whether it is in their interest 
to become parties to them. Furthermore, a number of countries which, 
although having ratified these conventions, have not given domestic 
effect to them. There appears to be a need for greater attention to these 
conventions, enhanced legal education and better domestic legislation. 
The intellectual capacity to redress these problems has not necessarily 
been established yet in many developing countries and there is scope 
for cooperation to assist in building the required skills and expertise.
A particular legal framework issue arises from the fact that that 
the ISPS Code applies only to so-called "SOLAS ships" i.e. commercial 
ships over 500 gross tonnage that are employed on international voyages. 
Unless extended by national legislation31, it does not apply to fishing 
vessels, ships under 500 gross tonnage, or to merchant ships employed 
only in domestic trade. The number of vessels to which the ISPS code 
does not apply is particularly large in East Asia where there are large 
fishing fleets, many smaller trading vessels, and big domestic 
commercial fleets, particularly in China, Japan, Indonesia and the 
Philippines. Countries need to consider the feasibility of extending the 
ISPS code to "non-SOLAS" ships.
Conclusions
The paper has explored the relationship in general terms between these 
different concepts of maritime security and the implications for navies, 
coast guards, national maritime administrations and so on. Generally it 
would seem that the new security challenges require greater flexibility 
and pose some challenges for established divisions of responsibility. 
These might lead to counter-productive battles between agencies on 
issues of "turf".
What does this all mean for our CSCAP Study Group? Where can 
CSCAP value add to the activities that are already happening in the 
region? In the past the CSCAP Maritime Cooperation Working Group 
has taken a comprehensive view of maritime security but we should now
31 The Maritime Transport Security Act (Commonwealth) 2003 in Australia, for 
example, extends ISPS provisions to all ships employed on interstate but not to ones 
employed on intrastate voyages.
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refine that view somewhat. We should embrace both comprehensive and 
non-traditional security. Our concept of maritime security should cover 
the threats of piracy, terrorism, trafficking in drugs, arms or humans 
and some types of environmental threat, particularly ship-sourced 
marine pollution. It should include cooperative aspects of maritime 
safety and of national security (such as joint and coordinated patrols 
and cooperative approaches to surveillance and situational awareness), 
as well as cooperative measures to prevent the maritime transportation 
system being used for illegal purposes.
Capacity-building should occur at all levels (national, sub regional, 
regional, and international). It should cover the development of 
organizational, operational, legal, and human resources capabilities. 
There is a fundamental need for technical cooperation on maritime 
security. Developed countries need to assist less developed ones with 
building their capacity to deal with maritime security threats. This is 
not at the "sharp end" with the better equipped countries sending their 
own forces to patrol in high threat areas but rather through assistance 
with training and resources to build up local infrastructure, establish 
systems and procedures, and train personnel.
The countries in need of assistance must feel that they are still 
retaining control over waters under their sovereignty and that they have 
some influence over the process of maritime regime building through 
their collective bargaining weight. Perhaps an ad hoc workshop of like- 
minded countries might be useful with identifying issues of common 
concern and a possible way ahead. Indonesia with its expertise in law of 
the sea and its experience with coordinating the South China Sea 
Workshops may be well placed to take a leading role. Multidisciplinary 
and multinational education and training in maritime affairs conducted 
at a regional level would make an important contribution to building 
regional maritime awareness and an appreciation of the benefits of a 
collective regime. Maritime awareness is generally lacking in the region 
at present but is fundamental to the implementation of an effective 
maritime security regime.
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